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The Supreme Court sent shock waves through the civil rights
community last term when it ordered reargument in Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union (Patterson 1)1 of the following question:
"Whether or not the interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 adopted
by this Court in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), should
be reconsidered?" 2 The Court indicated in a per curiam opinion
that while it had not "decided today" to overrule Runyon, it had
"decided, in light of the difficulties posed by petitioner's argument
for a fundamental extension of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
to consider whether Runyon should be overruled. ' 3
This term, in Patterson 1I, 4 the Court ostensibly preserved
Runyon yet effectively gutted section 1981 as a meaningful em-
* Joseph S. Platt-Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur Professor of Law, The Ohio State
University College of Law. B.A., Antioch College, 1955; J.D., University of Wisconsin,
1960.
1 485 U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988).
2 108 S. Ct. at 1420. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982) provides as follows:
Equal rights under the law. All persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punish-
ment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind and to no
other.
I Patterson v. Mclean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617, -(1988) (emphasis in original).
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy joined the
Court's opinion. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented.
4 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, -U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
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ployment discrimination remedy. This Essay reviews the Court's
sua sponte and disingenuous, if not startling, revisionism.
I. RETROSPECTIVE ON PATTERSON I
A. Background of the Case
Patterson, a black woman, predicated her section 1981 claim
of racial harassment on grounds that the employer's president
periodically stared at her, overburdened her with work assignments,
assigned her menial tasks (sweeping and dusting) not given to
whites, and stated that blacks were slower workers than whites.5
In affirming the district court, the Fourth Circuit held that racial
harassment alone does not abridge the right to make and enforce
contracts protected by section 1981 .6 The court acknowledged that
racial harassment claims were cognizable under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 7 but distinguished the "broader language ' 8
of Title VII, reaching discrimination concerning "terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment," 9 from the "more narrow
prohibition" 10 of section 1981, reaching discrimination concerning
the making and enforcing contracts.' 1 Racial harassment may im-
plicate "terms and conditions" of employment under Title VII,
said the court, or be probative of discriminatory intent in section
1981 actions, but unlike hiring, firing, or promotion, it does not
"go to the very existence and nature of the employment con-
tract .... ",12
Tracking the Fourth Circuit's distinction between employment
terms and contract matters, the question presented by the petition
for certiorari was whether section 1981 encompasses claims of racial
discrimination and racial harassment as terms and conditions of
I Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, -U.S. .. 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2373 (1989)
(citing 805 F.2d 1143, 1145). Patterson also claimed a discriminatory denial of promotion
and constructive discharge under § 1981, as well as a pendent state claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 2369.
6 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143 (4th Cir. 1986). The court also
upheld a directed verdict against Patterson on the state distress claim, and a jury verdict
against Patterson on the promotion claim.
7 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1982).
1 Patterson, 805 F.2d at 1145.
9 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(a).
10 Patterson, 805 F.2d at 1145.
" 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
12 Patterson, 805 F.2d at 1145.
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employment. 13 As the Justices' law clerks undoubtedly discovered
in their research, the Fourth Circuit's decision conflicted with other
circuit holdings that section 1981 reaches claims of private racial
harassment and hostile working environments. 14 The Supreme Court
did not confine itself to exploration and resolution of that relatively
narrow conflict. Rather, the reargument order raised the far broader
question of whether Runyon's interpretation of section 1981 should
be reconsidered. While Runyon was neither the lead decision ex-
tending section 1981 to private racial discrimination nor an em-
ployment case, the import of the Court's order was ominous, albeit
ambiguous.
In dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, and Stevens, harshly criticized the majority for injudiciously
reaching out on an issue not presented by the parties with apparent
disregard for stare decisis principles.' 5 Justice Blackmun stated:
I am at a loss to understand the motivation of five Members of
this Court to reconsider an interpretation of a civil rights statute
that so clearly reflects our society's earnest commitment to ending
racial discrimination, and in which Congress so evidently has
acquiesced. I can find no justification for the bare majority's
apparent eagerness to consider rewriting well-established law. 6
B. Background on Section 1981
In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 1 7 the Supreme Court resur-
rected the long dormant Civil Rights Act of 1866,18 the antecedent
13 The petition also questioned a jury instruction concerning the claimant's burden of
proof in § 1981 promotion cases.
4 E.g., Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Prods. Corp., 772 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986), and cases cited therein.
" Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 1421.
16 Id. at 1422.
17 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
11 Act of April 9, 1866, c. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, reenacted as § 18 of the Enforcement
Act of 1870, Act of May 31, 1870, c. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144, and codified in §§ 1977
& 1978 of the Revised Statutes of 1874, now 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 1982. Section I of the
1866 Act provided as follows:
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign
power ... are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such
citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of
slavery or involuntary servitude ... shall have the same right, in every State
and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and
1989-90]
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of both 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (relating to contract19), and section 1982
(relating to property2 ), as a remedy for private racial discrimina-
tion.2 1 The Court held that section 1982 banned private racial
discrimination in the sale or rental of property, and that such
prohibition was a valid exercise of congressional power under the
thirteenth amendment. 2 Based upon the statutory language and an
extensive analysis of the legislative history, the Court found that
section 1 of the 1866 Act23 plainly reached "interference from any
source whatever, whether governmental or private," 24 and that
"§ 1 was meant to prohibit all racially motivated deprivations of
the rights enumerated in the statute.' '25
Congress was not only intent upon "eliminating the infamous
Black Codes," said the Jones Court, but also "was moved by a
larger objective-that of giving real content to the freedom guar-
anteed by the Thirteenth Amendment. '26 Congress was concerned
about both the "racist laws in the former rebel States" 27 and "the
mistreatment of Negroes by private individuals and unofficial
groups, mistreatment unrelated to any hostile state legislation. ' 28
The Court emphatically stated that:
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to
none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary
notwithstanding.
Restrictive construction of congressional powers under the thirteenth, fourteenth, and
fifteenth amendments by the Reconstruction-era Supreme Court had essentially negated the
potential safeguards of the Civil War amendments. See generally, L. TRE, AMIucAN
CONSTiTuTIONAL LAw §§ 330-53 (2d ed. 1988).
19 See supra note 2.
- 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982) provides as follows: "Property rights of citizens. All
citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is
enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property."
21 Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Black, Brennan, Stewart, Fortas, and Marshall
joined the Court's opinion. Justice Douglas concurred. Justices Harlan and White dissented.
See generally Kohl, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Its Hour Has Come Round At Last:
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 55 VA. L. REv. 272 (1969).
22 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See generally Note, Federal
Power to Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the
Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 CoLuM. L. REv. 449 (1974).
2 As noted in note 18, supra, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 1982 had their common origin in
§ 1 of the 1866 Act.




28 Id. at 427.
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In light of the concerns that led Congress to adopt it and the
contents of the debates that preceded its passage, it is clear that
the Act was designed to do just what its terms suggest: to prohibit
all racial discrimination, whether or not under color of law, with
respect to the rights enumerated therein-including the right to
purchase or lease property. 29
Analyzing the scope of the statutory protection, the Court specif-
ically noted that "the right to contract for employment [is] a right
secured by 42 U.S.C. § 1981."30
In light of the broad sweep of the language and history of the
1866 Act, the Jones Court was unwilling to carve an exception for
private conduct despite the absence of established precedent. The
Court agreed with the statement of Attorney General Ramsey Clark
at oral argument that "It]he fact that the statute lay partially
dormant for many years cannot be held to diminish its force
today.""'
Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association12 confirmed
the applicability of the Jones holding and analysis to section 1981
in the context of a private swimming club's racially exclusionary
guest policy.3 3 The Court noted that the "operative language of
both § 1981 and § 1982" was "traceable" to section 1 of the 1866
Act, and that "[i]n light of the historical interrelationship between
§ 1981 and § 1982" there was "no reason to construe these sections
differently." 3 4
Thereafter, in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc. 35 the
Court squarely held "that § 1981 affords a federal remedy against
discrimination in private employment on the basis of race." '3 6 Pre-
9Id. at 436.
Id. at 442 n.78.
3' Id. at 437.
32 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
11 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall,
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist joined the Court's unanimous opinion. See also Sullivan
v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (applying § 1982 to private recreational
club).
3' Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 439-40 (1973).
35 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
36 Id. at 459-60. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White,
Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined this aspect of the Court's
decision. See generally Brooks, Use of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 to Redress
Employment Discrimination, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 258 (1977); Larson, The Development of
Section 1981 as a Remedy for Racial Discrimination in Private Employment, 7 HAiv. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 56 (1971); Reiss, Requiem For An "Independent Remedy". The Civil Rights




vailing victims of discrimination, said the Court, were entitled to
both equitable and legal relief, including compensatory and puni-
tive damages. 37 Unlike the Fourth Circuit in Patterson, it is clear
that the Supreme Court in Johnson did not confine section 1981
to matters of literal contract existence, for Johnson involved alle-
gations against the employer not only of discriminatory discharge
but also of discriminatory seniority rules and job assignments, as
well as allegations against several unions of racially segregated
memberships. 38 The Johnson Court stated further that while ave-
nues of relief available under section 1981 and Title VII were
separate, distinct, and independent, 39 section 1981 was nevertheless
"related, and ... directed to most of the same ends" as the
"comprehensive" Title VII. 40
In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. ,41 the Su-
preme Court reaffirmed its holding in Johnson and held further
that the prohibitions of section 1981 reach racial discrimination in
private employment against white persons as well as black per-
sons. 42 Subsequently, in Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co. ,'4 the Court
affirmed findings that a union violated section 1981 and Title VII
by failing to challenge discriminatory discharges of probationers,
failing to file grievances over racial discrimination, and tolerating
and encouraging racial harassment. 44
17 Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975).
11 Id. at 455. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 107 S. Ct. 2617 (1987) (applying §
1981 to union's failure to challenge discriminatory discharges of probationers, failing to file
grievances over racial discrimination, and tolerating and encouraging racial harassment).
11 Johnson, 421 U.S. at 461. The Court held that § 1981 actions are independent from
Title VII actions and are neither dependent upon nor tolled by invocation of Title VII
proceedings. (Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dissented on the tolling issue.) See
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48 (1974). "[T]he legislative history of
Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently
his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes."
40 Johnson, 421 U.S. at 454, 461. In Brown v. General Services Admin., 425 U.S.
820 (1976), the Court held that Title VII remedies were exclusive for federal employees.
The Court found that congressional purposes differed for federal and private sector em-
ployees. The Court distinguished Johnson as not raising sovereign immunity problems and
resting on affirmative congressional intention to make Title VII and § 1981 remedies
coextensive in the private sector and not mutually exclusive.
4 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
2 Id. at 295-96. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall,
Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens joined this aspect of the decision. Justices White and
Rehnquist dissented on the ground that § 1981 was inapplicable to the case. The Court was
unanimous in holding that Title VII proscribed racial discrimination against whites.
43 482 U.S. 656 (1987).
" Id. at 669. Justice White delivered the Court's opinion, joined in relevant part by
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In light of the foregoing breadth already accorded section 1981
in employment actions, the Supreme Court's expressed concern in
the Patterson I reargument order over "a fundamental extension
of liability' 45 was opaque if not disingenuous.
C. The View From Runyon
So what about Runyon v. McCrary,46 the precedent targeted
by the Patterson I reargument order? In the words of the Runyon
Court on the case, "[t]he principal issue presented by these con-
solidated cases is whether federal law, namely 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
prohibits private schools from excluding qualified children solely
because they are Negroes." 47 The Court answered the question in
the affirmative, holding that private racial exclusion of parents
seeking to enter contractual relationships with various schools for
educational services was a "classic violation of § 1981,'" 48 and that
such conclusion "follows inexorably from the language of that
statute, as construed in Jones, Tillman, and Johnson.
' 49
The Runyon Court clearly perceived nothing original or unique
about its interpretation of section 1981. On the contrary, again
citing Jones, Tillman, and Johnson, the Court stated that "[i]t is
now well established that ... § 1981, prohibits racial discrimina-
tion in the making and enforcement of private contracts." 50 The
argument that section 1981 does not reach private acts of racial
discrimination, said the Court, was "wholly inconsistent" with
Jones and its progeny, and no reason existed to deviate from stare
decisis principles.5'
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. Justice Powell,
joined by Justices Scalia and O'Connor, dissented in relevant part on the ground that the
evidence was inadequate to support the conclusion that the union engaged in intentional
discrimination against black members.
Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 1420.
427 U.S. 160 (1976).
41 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 163 (1976).
Id. at 172.
"I Id. at 173. Justice Stewart delivered the Court's opinion, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens. Justices Powell
and Stevens also filed concurring opinions. Justice White filed a dissenting opinion, joined
by Justice Rehnquist.
50 Id. at 168.
51 Id. at 174. The Court noted that during consideration of the 1972 amendments to
Title VII (Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 103, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-
2000e-15 (1982)), Congress rejected efforts to reverse Jones-Johnson and deny § 1981
recourse in private sector employment discrimination cases.
1989-90]
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The Patterson I reargument plot thickens upon examination of
Justice White's dissenting opinion in Runyon, joined by Justice
Rehnquist. In Justice White's view, the language of section 1981
simply gave blacks the same rights to make and enforce contracts
as whites, namely, the right to enter binding agreements with
willing parties. Section 1981 thus merely invalidates governmental
imposition of contractual disability.52 Therefore, neither whites nor
blacks could impose contractual obligations upon unwilling private
persons, regardless of motivation. Careful analysis of the legislative
history, said Justice White, reveals that section 1981 was enacted
pursuant to Congress' fourteenth amendment equal protection of
the laws rather than thirteenth amendment (badges and incidents
of slavery) powers, and thus confirms that section 1981 reaches
disabling legal rules, not private refusals.5 3
Justice White noted that Congress had banned private racial
discrimination in employment and housing markets, but had gone
no further, and that it was not for the judiciary to expand upon
those areas. In his view, extension of section 1981 to all racially
motivated contractual decisions threatened undue judicial interfer-
ence into private associational relationships.14
12 Justice White stated:
Section 1981 would thus invalidate any state statute or court-made rule of law
which would have the effect of disabling Negroes or any other class of persons
from making contracts or enforcing contractual obligations or otherwise giving
less weight to their obligations than is given to contractual obligations running
to whites.
Id. at 194.
11 ld. at 202.
Justice White expressed his central policy concerns as follows:
The majority's holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits all racially motivated
contractual decisions-particularly coupled with the Court's decision in
McDonald ... that whites have a cause of action against others including
blacks for racially motivated refusals to contract-threatens to embark the
Judiciary on a treadherous course. Whether such conduct should be condoned
or not, whites and blacks will undoubtedly choose to form a variety of
associational relationships pursuant to contracts which exclude members of
the other race. Social clubs, black and white, and associations designed to
further the interests of blacks or whites are but two examples. Lawsuits by
members of the other race attempting to gain admittance to such an association
are not pleasant to contemplate. As the associational or contractual relation-
ships become more private, the pressures to hold § 1981 inapplicable to them
will increase. Imaginative judicial construction of the word "contract" is
foreseeable; Thirteenth Amendment limitations on Congress' power to ban
"badges and incidents of slavery" may be discovered; the doctrine of the right
to association may be bent to cover a given situation. In any event, courts
will be called upon to balance sensitive policy considerations against each
[VOL. 78
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With regard to considerations of stare decisis, Justice White
distinguished Jones as concerning section 1982, a thirteenth amend-
ment statute that could and did reach private conduct respecting
real estate sales, while section 1981 was a fourteenth amendment
statute "under which the Congress may and did reach only state
action. ' 55 As for Johnson, continued Justice White, the grant of
certiorari was limited to a section 1981 statute of limitations ques-
tion, and the statement in Johnson that section 1981 reached
private racially motivated refusals to contract therefore was dic-
tum.5 6 Tillman, concluded Justice White, was irrelevant, for the
Court merely held that the swimming club was not exempt as a
private club under section 1981 or section 1982; the Court did not
address whether a section 1981 cause of action existed.57
Concurring in Runyon,5 8 Justice Powell was inclined to agree
with Justice White that section 1981 did not reach private contrac-
tual choices but was not prepared to disregard Court precedent to
the contrary. In his view, those decisions established that section
1981 reaches certain acts of racial discrimination that are consid-
ered private because no state action was involved. He expressed
concern, however, that section 1981 not be construed so broadly
as to intrude upon certain personal contractual relationships with
long respected associational rights (e.g., private tutor, babysitter,
housekeeper, small kindergarten or music class) .59 Runyon did not
present such a case, but rather concerned an open commercial offer
to the public generally.
Also concurring in Runyon,6 Justice Stevens would have over-
ruled Jones and its progeny but for the regressive impact of such
a reversal. In his view, section 1 of the 1866 Act was not intended
to prohibit private racial discrimination but was "intended only to
guarantee all citizens the same legal capacity to make and enforce
contracts, to obtain, own, and convey property, and to litigate and
give evidence."' Two reasons warranted overruling Jones, said
other-considerations which have never been addressed by any Congress-all
under the guise of "construing" a statute. This is a task appropriate for the




Id. at 214 n.16.
Id. at 186.
Id. at 187.




Justice Stevens: first, Jones was wrong; second, reliance on Jones
had not been so extensive as to foreclose reversal.6 2 Considerations
of stability and orderly development of the law, however, out-
weighed these reasons. Justice Stevens observed that "even if Jones
did not accurately reflect the sentiments of the Reconstruction
Congress, it surely accords with the prevailing sense of justice
today. ' 6 Justice Stevens continued:
The policy of the Nation as formulated by the Congress in recent
years has moved constantly in the direction of eliminating racial
segregation in all sectors of society. This Court has given a
sympathetic and liberal construction to such legislation. For the
Court now to overrule Jones would be a significant step back-
wards, with effects that would not have arisen from a correct
decision in the first instance. Such a step would be so clearly
contrary to my understanding of the mores of today that I think
the Court is entirely correct in adhering to Jones.64
Such prudential considerations, repeated by Justices Stevens,
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun in their dissents from the rear-
gument order in Patterson 1,6- did not concern the Patterson I
majority. That Runyon's construction of section 1981 may have
benefited civil rights plaintiffs by expanding statutory liability was
irrelevant, said the Court, for, even in stare decisis analysis, all
litigants must be treated equally.66 "[T]he claim of any litigant for
the application of a rule to its case should not be influenced by
the Court's view of the worthiness of the litigant in terms of
extralegal criteria.' '67
This retrospective analysis is revealing for it suggests that em-
ployment discrimination was only part of the majority's concern
in Patterson L It seemed doubtful that the majority was hesitant
to impose legal responsibility upon employers for racial harassment
including that which creates a hostile working environment. Indeed,
Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court in-
cluding Justices White and O'Connor in Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 68 holding that sexual harassment that creates a hostile or
61 Id. at 190.
61 Id. at 191.
- Id. at 191-92.
65 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 1421-23.
16 Id. at 1421.
67 Id.
477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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abusive work environment violates Title VII, whether or not the
sexual misconduct is directly linked to economic benefits. 69 The
focus of the majority's 70 concern seemed to be on the potential
intrusion of an expansionist interpretation of section 1981 on
uniquely private associational or contractual relationships. Reex-
amination of Runyon therefore implicated a sphere of conduct far
broader than employment discrimination.
Some of the Justices apparently believed that overruling Run-
yon would have minimal impact upon employment discrimination
because of the sweep of Title VII. Thus, Justice White noted in
his Runyon dissent that Congress had already "ban[ned] private
racial discrimination in most of the job market." 71 Justice Black-
mun noted in his Patterson I dissent that "it is probably true that
most racial discrimination in the employment context will continue
to be redressable under other statutes." 72 Justice Stevens noted in
his Patterson I dissent the "substantial overlap" between section
1981 and Title VII and the consequently limited impact of Runyon
reconsideration on the employment area.73 In an ultimate substan-
tive sense these Justices may well have been right.
Conceptually, the prohibitions of Title VII are comprehensive
and in many respects broader than section 1981. For example,
unlike Title VII, which reaches private discrimination based upon
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, section 1981 reaches
only race and certain ethnic discrimination. 74 Unlike Title VII,
6 Id. at 73. Title VII, said the Court, is not limited to economic or tangible discrim-
ination. "The phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' evinces a congressional
intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in
employment." Id. at 64 (quoting Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th
Cir. 1971)).
In so finding, the Court endorsed the rationale articulated in Rogers v. EEOC, 454
F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972), where the Fifth Circuit
found a racially discriminatory work environment to be illegal:
IT]he phrase "terms, conditions or privileges of employment" in [Title VIII
is an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit the practice
of creating a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial
discrimination .... One can readily envision working environments as heavily
polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psy-
chological stability of minority group workers.
Id. at 66.
70 The majority consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, O'Connor,
Scalia, and Kennedy.
7, Runyon, 427 U.S. at 212.
7 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 1422.
73 Id.
14 See Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617 (1987).
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which reaches both discriminatorily-motivated intentional discrim-
ination (disparate treatment) and nondiscriminatorily-motivated un-
intentional discrimination (disparate impact), section 1981 reaches
only purposeful discrimination .7
There are nevertheless significant differences between section
1981 and Title VII. For example, unlike Title VII, section 1981
coverage is not limited to statutorily defined employers or unions
but reaches any person. Likewise, coverage is not limited to persons
of particular size. Unlike Title VII, there are no cumbersome
administrative or limiting prerequisites to a suit under section 1981 .76
Unlike Title VII, section 1981 plaintiffs are not limited to back
pay and affirmative job relief but are entitled to equitable and
legal relief, including compensatory and sometimes punitive dam-
ages. 77 Also unlike Title VII, section 1981 plaintiffs are entitled to
jury trials for legal claims. 8
Thus, it was clear that to overrule Runyon, with Jones and its
progeny toppling, would impact upon civil rights generally and
employment discrimination particularly. Stated otherwise, how far
could Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White push (lead) their
new conservative majority?
II. PATTERSON II
The Supreme Court's resolution of the Runyon reargument
question and demarcation of the bounds of section 1981 in Patter-
son IP9 are vintage jurisprudential legerdemain. Absent special
circumstances warranting deviation from stare decisis principles,
7' See General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982).
76 E.g., Taylor v. Safeway Stores, 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975); Gresham v. Cham-
bers, 501 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1974). See also Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982)
(no exhaustion of administrative remedies required in § 1983 actions).
" See Johnson, 421 U.S. at 460-61: "An individual who establishes a cause of action
under § 1981 is entitled to both equitable and legal relief, including compensatory and,
under certain circumstances, punitive damages." See generally 2 C. SUtLLVAN, M. ZmoffR
& R. RicHARDs, EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMNATION §§ 23.1-23.5 (2d ed. 1988).
71 Compare Harmon v. May Broadcasting Co., 583 F.2d 410 (8th Cir. 1978) (no right
to jury trial under Title VII) with Setser v. Novack Investment Co., 638 F.2d 1137 (8th
Cir. 1981), vacated in part on other grounds, 657 F.2d 962, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064
(1981) (right to jury trial in § 1981 actions).
19 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, -U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989). Justice
Kennedy delivered the Court's opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White, O'Connor, and Scalia. Justice Brennan filed an opinion concurring in part in the
judgment and dissenting in part, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, and in part by




the Court would adhere to Runyon's teaching that section 1981
reaches private conduct. Based upon the plain statutory "make
... [and] enforce contracts" language of section 1981, however,
and accommodation to the Title VII scheme, section 1981 reaches
only discriminatory contract formation or impairment of contract
enforcement and not post-formation discriminatory employment
conditions, i.e., harassment. 0 "Section 1981 cannot be construed
as a general proscription of racial discrimination in all aspects of
contract relations." 8 Notwithstanding this curtailment of a major
weapon in the civil rights arsenal, the Court says we should con-
tinue to believe in its dedication to nondiscrimination:
The law now reflects society's consensus that discrimination
based on the color of one's skin is a profound wrong of tragic
dimension. Neither our words nor our decisions should be inter-
preted as signaling one inch of retreat from Congress' policy to
forbid discrimination in the private, as well as the public, sphere.82
There is an old saying that what you are stands over you all the
while, and I cannot hear what you say to the contrary. Whatever
the Justices' ideals, the institutional message is hardly progressive.
Eschewing any analysis of legislative history, the Court predi-
cates its crippling of section 1981 upon hard literalism and post
hoc statutory harmonization. Discrimination in the making of con-
tracts concerns establishment of the relation, 83 not post-formation
burden or breach. Discrimination in the enforcement of contracts
concerns the protection of a legal process, not generalized relational
interference. If section 1981 covers discriminatory post-formation
employment terms and conditions, what remains for Title VII?
"We should be reluctant . .. to read an earlier statute broadly
where the result is to circumvent the detailed remedial scheme
constructed in a later statute.' '84
It seems a bit late in the decisional day to be seriously con-
cerned with statutory harmonization. Overlap and logical inconsis-
" Id. at 2372.
S, Id.
rId. at 2379.
S The Court held plaintiff's claim of discriminatory promotion denial actionable
under § 1981 to the extent the changed position entailed the opportunity to enter into a
new contract with the employer. "Only where the promotion rises to the level of an
opportunity for a new and distinct relation between the employee and the employer is such
a claim actionable under § 1981." 109 S. Ct. at 2377. The Court also held plaintiff was




tency were implicit in resurrection of the Civil War statutes. Yet
Johnson forthrightly declared that avenues of relief available under
section 1981 and Title VII were separate, distinct, and independent,
and that section 1981 was "related, and . . . directed to most of
the same ends" as the "comprehensive" Title VIIA5 Title VII and
Jones6 have been extant for twenty-five years and twenty years,
respectively. As so eloquently put by Justice Blackmun in his
Patterson I reargument dissent, such interpretation "clearly reflects
our society's earnest commitment to ending racial discrimination,
and in which Congress so evidently has acquiesced. '87
By dismantling section 1981, the Court denies timely relief,
compensatory and punitive damages, jury trials, class actions, and
wider employer coverage in a host of employment discrimination
cases. The Court articulates adherence to stare decisis yet effectively
negates much of the Jones-Johnson theme in the employment
milieu. Why? Because section 1981 access crowds judicial dockets?
Because the prospect of tougher section 1981 remedies discourages
more limited Title VII settlements? These realities have been with
us now for many years, seemingly in accordance with congressional
determination, as related by the Court, to make "principles of
nondiscrimination.., a matter of highest priority. 8 8 Unless I am
missing something, Congress has not reneged on that commitment,
and, indeed, has repeatedly thwarted Court backsliding.8 9
The Court's curtailment of section 1981 access and remedies
for employment discrimination was dramatically underscored one
week after Patterson II in Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dis-
trict,9° where the Court held that section 1981 does not provide an
independent federal action for damages against local governmental
entities. Rather, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 91 with its color of law require-
8 Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 461 (1974).
6 See supra notes 17-31 and accompanying text.
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 1419, 1422 (1988).
* Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 66
(1975).
9 E.g., Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982) (rejecting
the Court's view, articulated in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145 (1976) that
pregnancy discrimination was not sex discrimination).
- - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989).
91 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides as follows:
[E]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immu-
nities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
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ments, provides the exclusive federal remedy against state govern-
mental units for violation of rights guaranteed in section 1981.
Further, held Jett, liability under section 1983 cannot be predicated
upon a respondeat superior theory.92 To borrow from Justice Bren-
nan's dissent in Jett, the result of Patterson II and Jett is "aston-
ishing," and "raise[s] the possibility that this landmark civil rights
statute affords no civil redress at all." 93
So, a majority of the Justices seem to believe that the time has
come to contain the civil rights litigation explosion. Professor
James E. Jones, Jr. was correct in saying: "How quickly we seem
to forget what the 1950's and the 1960's were all about." '9 4 In an
ultimate sense, the real tragedy of this reconsideration saga, how-
ever rationalized, will be the chilling effect upon the victims of
discrimination, and the lawyers who would champion their cause.
See, e.g., Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2724.
Jones, The Origins of Affirmative Action, 21 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 383, 417 (1988).
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